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S U M M A R Y
Background: Infectious diseases remain a major public health problem worldwide. Hence, their
surveillance is critical. Currently, many surveillance strategies and systems are in use around the world.
An inventory of the data, surveillance strategies, and surveillance systems developed worldwide for the
surveillance of infectious diseases is presented herein, with emphasis on the role of the microbiology
laboratory in surveillance.
Methods: The data, strategies, and systems used around the world for the surveillance of infectious
diseases and pathogens, along with current issues and trends, were reviewed.
Results: Twelve major classes of data were identiﬁed on the basis of their timing relative to infection,
resources available, and type of surveillance. Two primary strategies were compared: disease-speciﬁc
surveillance and syndromic surveillance. Finally, 262 systems implemented worldwide for the
surveillance of infections were registered and brieﬂy described, with a focus on those based on
microbiological data from laboratories.
Conclusions: There is currently a wealth of available data on infections, which has been growing with the
recent emergence of new technologies. Concurrently with the expansion of computer resources and
networks, these data will allow the optimization of real-time detection and notiﬁcation of infections.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Classiﬁed as the second leading cause of death in humans by the
World Health Organization, with approximately 15 million deaths
worldwide every year,1 infectious diseases remain a serious public
health problem in the 21st century. Among them, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria have been nicknamed the ‘big three’
because of their important impact on global human health. In
2011, tuberculosis infected two billion people and killed 1.3 mil-
lion, malaria infected 207 million people and killed 62 700, and HIV
infected 35.3 million people and killed 1.6 million.2
For adequate measures to be taken to detect and ﬁght infectious
diseases, their surveillance is essential. Surveillance consists of
‘‘the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of
health data essential to the planning, implementation, and
evaluation of public health practice, closely integrated with the
timely dissemination of these data to those who need to know’’.3* Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 0 4 91 32 43 75; fax: +33 0 4 91 38 77 72
E-mail address: didier.raoult@gmail.com (D. Raoult).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2016.04.021
1201-9712/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Attempts to survey infectious diseases are not recent. One of the
best known examples is the use of the London Bills of Mortality by
clerks, starting in 1603, for weekly monitoring of the number of
deaths in London.4 Later, in 1854, John Snow performed a
topographic study in London by systematically recording the
addresses of people infected with cholera, to identify the source of
the pathogen.5 Currently, many surveillance strategies and
systems are available around the world. Computer resources have
expanded considerably, but infectious disease surveillance
remains challenging. The 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza pandemic6 and
the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa7 are recent examples
showing that infectious diseases cannot be predicted and modelled
reliably.
Nevertheless, the detection and investigation of abnormal
health-related events effectively allow the identiﬁcation of true
epidemic events. The abnormal increase in the number of young
homosexual men infected by Pneumocystis carinii in Los Angeles
between 1980 and 19818 prompted the discovery of the HIV virus
in 1983.9 Similarly, the outbreak of a severe respiratory illness of
unknown origin that affected 180 people who had attended a state
American Legion convention in Philadelphia in July 1976 allowedciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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unknown respiratory disease with no identiﬁable cause was
diagnosed and reported in several people living in Guangdong
Province in China. The syndrome, termed ‘severe acute respiratory
syndrome’ (SARS), rapidly crossed borders and became a
worldwide threat.11 A coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was ﬁnally identi-
ﬁed as the causative agent of the syndrome.12
With consideration of these aspects, an inventory of the data,
surveillance strategies, and surveillance systems developed world-
wide for the surveillance of infectious diseases is presented herein,
with emphasis on the role of the microbiology laboratory in
surveillance.
2. Infectious disease surveillance — Data used for surveillance
Fig. 1 summarizes the main types of data available for
surveillance. These were classiﬁed according to the outbreak
detection continuum published by Texier and Buisson.13
2.1. Human environment
2.1.1. Environmental data
Environmental data include water pollution, weather, and air
pollution. For example, water quality testing from samples
collected at water treatment facilities could be used to explain
an increase in the number of patients presenting to emergency
departments because of gastrointestinal disorders, as was done in
the case of ice made during the massive outbreak of Cryptospo-
ridium in Milwaukee.14
2.1.2. Animal health
Animal health data come directly from wild and domestic
animals and are particularly valuable for the surveillance of
zoonotic diseases such as plague, rabies, and monkeypox. ForDemographic data
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Fig. 1. Main sources of data used by syndromicexample, Chaintoutis et al. successfully used serum collected from
sentinel juvenile domestic pigeons for the early detection of West
Nile virus in Central Macedonia, Greece.15
2.2. Human behaviour
2.2.1. Internet use
The Internet can be used for infectious disease surveillance.16
Studies on inﬂuenza have proven the efﬁcacy of the use of Web
queries to complement existing surveillance methods. For exam-
ple, the use of Web data to predict ﬂu in Canada using FluWatch
was done successfully and at a low cost, which inspired Google to
develop Google Flu Trends, a free forecasting tool allowing the real-
time surveillance of inﬂuenza activity in the USA .17 However, such
an approach should not be used to replace traditional epidemio-
logical surveillance networks as ﬂu-tracking techniques based on
Web data are more likely to be affected by changes in people’s
search behaviour.18 Another type of internet-based data usable for
surveillance is health-related dispatches. These data include,
among others, press dispatches from various origins like Reuters
(http://fr.reuters.com/) and Humanitarian News (http://
humanitariannews.org/), electronic mail-based discussion groups
like ProMED-mail (http://www.promedmail.org/), press articles,
and institutional and non-institutional warning networks like the
World Health Organization.19,20
2.2.2. Telephone triage hotlines
Telephone triage hotlines receive numerous phone calls from
people requiring immediate health care assistance. Electronic data
extracted from these hotlines can be a valuable source of data for
surveillance. Although hotlines are inherently non-speciﬁc, data
can be produced regardless of the day of the week, weather
conditions, or holidays if the triage hotline is operated around theData collected  by  physicians
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basic information about the caller, their area of residence, and
some description of the symptoms.21
2.2.3. Drug sales
When people fall sick, they either go to see the doctor, treat
themselves with home remedies, or practice self-medication by
purchasing non-prescription remedies from a drugstore. In the
latter case, sales data are entered electronically in store databases.
These data are interesting for infectious disease surveillance
because they reﬂect customer behaviour. Indeed, the class of drug
sold, the quantity, and the date of purchase can provide signiﬁcant
information on the age distribution, size, and level of access to
health care of a given population.21
2.2.4. Absenteeism
Absenteeism data include work and school absenteeism
declarations. These can be used for the early detection of
outbreaks, as has been demonstrated with inﬂuenza in France.16
Absenteeism data can also provide critical information about an
outbreak, such as the place where people have been infected.16
Therefore, if several children or students are unable to go to school
within a short span of time because of stomach pain, and if they all
ate in the same place the day before, it is reasonable to suspect that
they are all affected by the same food-borne pathogen.
2.3. Health care
2.3.1. Sentinel surveillance
Sentinel physicians are physicians who agree to notify the
public health authorities at regular intervals of patients presenting
certain speciﬁc symptoms (e.g., inﬂuenza-like illness). Public
health authorities analyse the data obtained and assess the activity
and strains of diseases circulating in the population of interest.16
2.3.2. Chief complaints
Chief complaints consist of short sentences or codes summa-
rizing the reason for the emergency department admission (for
example ‘headache’ or ‘abdominal pain’).16,21 Multiple chief
complaints can be registered for the same patient, the ﬁrst one
being the most important for infectious disease surveillance.16
Once registered, chief complaints can be classiﬁed into syndromic
surveillance categories manually or using algorithms.21
2.3.3. Medical records
When patients attend for medical examinations, physicians ask
them questions to collect useful information on their health status,
including the date of appearance of the symptoms and their
progression over time. These data help physicians deﬁne the
symptoms affecting the patient. Next, the physicians physically
examine the patients to collect data on the signs of the disease.
Together, signs and symptoms help the physicians to assign a
differential diagnosis and create a list of probable diseases that may
be affecting the patient. These records are translated into codes using
the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, ninth revision (ICD-9).
These codes can then be grouped into syndromic categories.16,21,22
2.3.4. Hospital discharge data
Hospital discharge data include ICD-9 codes, hospital zip code,
home zip code, the patient’s age, and the patient’s dates of
admission and discharge.16 These data can be useful for the
surveillance of infectious diseases.
2.3.5. Microbiology orders
Physicians and hospitals may ask laboratories to perform
microbiological tests to conﬁrm or exclude the presence ofpathogens in patients. These tests include, among others, culture
tests, nucleic acid ampliﬁcation tests, serological tests, and
agglutination tests. These tests can be used for the pre-diagnostic
surveillance of pathogens. The number of a particular speciﬁc or
non-speciﬁc test performed per unit of time can be a good indicator
of the presence of a particular pathogen in a given population.21
However, as the results of these tests are either positive or
negative, they allow only low speciﬁcity surveillance, which can
lead to the investigation of the wrong epidemiological events.
2.3.6. Notiﬁable disease reports
Notiﬁable disease reports consist of mandatory reporting by
mail, phone, fax, or using a computer, of diseases deﬁned by health
departments as being a threat to the community of interest.16 The
list of diseases may be deﬁned at the national level or at the state
level, and varies according to ﬂuctuations in the incidence and
prevalence of pathogens over time.16,21
2.4. Demographics
Vital statistics include data on birth, death, and marital status.16
Birth data can provide information on the cause of premature
delivery or birth anomalies, but can equally be used for the
surveillance of infant mortality.16 Death certiﬁcates are also
valuable in surveillance because they include the cause, age, and
the place of death.16
3. Infectious disease surveillance — Surveillance strategies
Disease surveillance can be divided broadly into disease-
speciﬁc surveillance, syndromic surveillance, and event-based
surveillance (Table 1). The latter surveillance class falls outside the
scope of this review and is not considered comprehensively herein.
3.1. Disease-speciﬁc surveillance
Disease-speciﬁc surveillance consists of the surveillance of a
selection of diseases, syndromes, and risk exposures considered as
public health threats for the population of interest.16,23 This is the
traditional form of surveillance, based on notiﬁable disease
reporting using clinical case reports sent by sentinel structures
or general practitioners and positive results reported from clinical
laboratories.16,23 These systems can be deployed at the national
level.
A good example is the National Tuberculosis Surveillance
System (NTSS),24 which was ﬁrst implemented in 1953 in the USA
for the collection of data on tuberculosis cases. Brieﬂy, if a patient is
positive for Mycobacterium tuberculosis, the state health depart-
ment sends an anonymous report to the NTSS. Reports summariz-
ing the data are then published on the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention website (http://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/default.
htm). In France, various disease-speciﬁc surveillance networks
have been developed under the leadership of the Institut National
de Veille Sanitaire (INVS), the French National Institute for Public
Health Surveillance. Among these, special mention can be made of
LaboVIH, a laboratory-based surveillance system implemented in
2001 for the national speciﬁc surveillance of HIV activity.25 Twice a
year, the INVS contacts all of the French biomedical laboratories
(approximately 4300 laboratories in 2014) to collect data on the
number of people tested for HIV and the number of people found to
be positive for the ﬁrst time in each laboratory in the network.25
The analysis is then shared through the weekly INVS epidemiology
report (http://www.invs.sante.fr). Such surveillance can be imple-
mented internationally, as has been done for the European
Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme (Euro-GASP).26
This surveillance system was implemented in 2004 by the
Table 1
Advantages and limitations of the main types of surveillance system developed to follow infectious diseases around the world
Type of surveillance system Principle Advantage(s) Limitation(s)
Disease-speciﬁc
surveillance
system
Surveillance of speciﬁc pathogens,
diseases, or syndromes in a target
population
 Surveillance of a wide range of pathogens
 Useful to follow global trends of surveyed
pathogens
 Can be used to monitor public health measures
taken to ﬁght precise pathogens
 Standardization of data used is necessary
 Limited capacities can lead to
underestimated prevalence of the
surveyed event
 Targets (pathogens, diseases, syndromes,
and populations) must be clearly identiﬁed
before starting the surveillance
Syndromic
surveillance
system
Real-time or near real-time collection,
analysis, interpretation, and dissemination
of health-related data for the early
identiﬁcation of potential health threats
 Can be used in emergency cases
 High sensitivity because laboratory
conﬁrmation is not needed
 Possible deployment in low-incomes countries
 Rapid to implement
 Efﬁciency depends on pathogens and
patient characteristics
 Lack of human and technological
resources can affect data collection,
management, timeliness, and sharing
 Low speciﬁcity
Event-based
surveillance
system
Real-time or near-real-time manual or
automatic collection and analysis of
unstructured information from numerous
text sources and in various languages to
detect potential or conﬁrmed health
hazards
 Use of potentially unveriﬁed information from
medical and non-medical informal sources of
data
 Can be used in low-income countries with no
public health surveillance
 Rapid detection and report of possible health
hazards
Gathering and analysis of data published in
various different languages
 Detected events need to be conﬁrmed
using reliable sources of data
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(ESSTI) to provide data on the susceptibility of gonococci to various
antibiotics by studying the evolution of gonococcal antibiotic
resistance in the European Union and the European Economic
Area.26 All of the states included in the ESSTI were asked to
participate in the Euro-GASP to contribute to the collection and
antibiotic susceptibility testing of gonococcal strains in their
laboratories.26
3.2. Syndromic surveillance
According to Sala Soler et al., syndromic surveillance is based on
data that are ‘‘non-speciﬁc health indicators including clinical
signs, symptoms as well as proxy measures’’, which ‘‘are usually
collected for purposes other than surveillance and, where possible,
are automatically generated’’ for allowing ‘‘a real-time (or near
real-time) collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of
health-related data to enable the early identiﬁcation of the impact
(or absence of impact) of potential human or veterinary public
health threats’’.27 Syndromic surveillance systems collect and
analyse health indicators such as nurse calls and school or work
absenteeism rates.21,22,27 These systems are known to be non-
speciﬁc but are sensitive and timely because data can be collected
automatically without extra work.22,27,28 Moreover, as data
sources can be varied, these systems allow interconnectivity
among participants, increasing the capacity of public health
authorities to manage possible epidemic situations.22 Finally, such
surveillance systems can assist public health leaders in their
decision-making on the guidance, implementation, and evaluation
of programs and policies for the prevention and control of
infectious diseases.29
A good example of a syndromic surveillance system is ESSENCE
(the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notiﬁcation of
Community-Based Epidemics).30 The implementation of ESSENCE
started as a collaboration between the US Department of Defense
and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory more
than a decade ago.30 The ﬁrst version of ESSENCE, ESSENCE I, is
currently used to perform worldwide monitoring of the army
personnel in all US military treatment facilities.31 The latest
version of ESSENCE, ESSENCE II, performs integrated surveillance
by analysing de-identiﬁed data from the National Capital Region
military and civilian health department data.31 The data collectedby ESSENCE II include information on military ambulatory visits
and prescription medications, and various data from civilian
databases including chief complaint data from civilian emergency
departments.31 Once received, the data are archived and analysed.
ESSENCE II transfers information to its users via secure websites.31
To summarize, users can see data and results in different formats,
including a map of the geographic distribution of data sent by users
and clusters obtained by scan statistics or lists of alerts emitted
after the detection processes.31 ESSENCE II normally analyses data
every 4 h but can also alter the processing period if real-time data
are available.31 The French armed forces developed a real-time
syndromic surveillance system, ‘‘le syste`me d’Alerte et Surveil-
lance en Temps re´el’’ or ASTER.32–34 Brieﬂy, every 10 minutes, the
system collects medical data routinely transmitted via secure
Internet connections by doctors, paramedics, and nurses who live
with the French armed forces deployed outside of the country. The
data include the numbers of military personnel suffering from
various symptoms, including cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and
respiratory symptoms. Data are routinely analysed using the
Current Past Graph method and the mean  2 or 3 standard
deviations method . At the end of the process, a dashboard
summarizing the epidemiological situation is presented to the
health service of the armed forces based in Marseille, France, and
doctors, paramedics, and nurses deployed with the armed forces
obtain real-time feedback on the health status of the military
personnel with whom they live.
3.3. Event-based surveillance
Event-based surveillance consists of the real-time or near-real-
time scanning, collection, and analysis of unstructured information
from diverse Internet sources (such as news or online discussion
platforms) for detecting potential or conﬁrmed health hazards
occurring worldwide from reports and rumours.35,36 Among the
most well known examples of event-based surveillance systems
are the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail,
http://www.promedmail.org/),37 the Global Public Health Intelli-
gence Network (GPHIN),38 MedISys (http://medisys.newsbrief.eu/
medisys/homeedition/fr/home.html),36 BioCaster, EpiSPIDER, and
HealthMap (http://www.healthmap.org/).19 These surveillance
systems are crucial sources of epidemic intelligence and contribute
greatly to the global detection of true outbreaks.35
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Laboratories produce some data currently usable for infectious
disease surveillance.
4.1. Different types of laboratory
According to Wagner et al., laboratories can be classiﬁed as
follows:16
(1) Clinical laboratories, which provide a wide range of services
from rapid screening tests to conﬁrmatory analyses usable for
the diagnosis and treatment of patients. This category of
laboratory includes laboratories of clinics, departments of
health, veterinary hospitals, and those in health care facilities
(hospitals, physician ofﬁces, etc.).
(2) Environmental laboratories, which perform analyses on
environmental samples to determine their physical, chemical,
and microbiological characteristics.
(3) Commercial laboratories, which are large, independent labo-
ratories that can perform tests on clinical and/or environmen-
tal samples. As these laboratories produce a large quantity of
data, they can be central structures for surveillance systems.
(4) Governmental laboratories, which include federal laboratories
that perform reference laboratory testing and participate in the
development of new laboratory technologies, state laboratories
that are involved in the surveillance of various diseases,
including communicable diseases but also in public health
programs, local public health laboratories that play a role in the
screening of diseases including tuberculosis or sexually
transmitted infections, and other state or local laboratories
that can provide valuable test results.Fig. 2. Infectious disease surveillance systems described around the world, January 2
edit?mid=z4TNutoSpTfw.k7NzPhL00pmc. The virus image represents surveillance sys
focusing on bacteria, the fungus image represents surveillance systems focusing on fung
different pathogens .Their functions generate a wide variety of information, making
them signiﬁcant sources of data on infectious diseases. Indeed,
they can conﬁrm the presence of target pathogens, diseases, or
syndromes in a population. Moreover, their activity can be used for
a syndromic monitoring system (e.g., the weekly number of tests
performed, etc. ). Finally, laboratory data can be used to investigate
epidemiological events (Fig. 1).
4.2. Current impact of laboratories on infectious disease surveillance
To evaluate the importance of laboratories in the worldwide
surveillance of infectious diseases, a PubMed search of papers in
English published between 2009 and June 13, 2014 was conducted.
The following keywords, always followed by ‘‘infectious diseases’’,
were used: ‘‘surveillance system’’, ‘‘laboratory-based surveillance’’,
‘‘syndromic surveillance’’, ‘‘sentinel surveillance’’, ‘‘integrated
surveillance’’, and ‘‘population-based surveillance’’. Only surveil-
lance systems using laboratory data were registered. If more than
one article described the same surveillance system, the surveil-
lance system was recorded only once. The systems were then
tagged according to what they monitor (bacteria, viruses, fungi,
parasites, or others), whether they are recognized nationally or
internationally, and whether they perform syndromic or disease-
speciﬁc surveillance (Supplementary Material Table S1; Fig. 2).
The analysis of the characteristics of the 262 surveillance
systems is summarized in Fig. 3. Brieﬂy, most of the surveillance
systems are recognized internationally or nationally, and perform
disease-speciﬁc surveillance. Most were implemented for the
surveillance of viruses (84 surveillance systems) and bacteria
(72 surveillance systems). Amongst the 76 pathogens monitored
by the surveillance systems, inﬂuenza was found to be the most
surveyed virus (monitored in 31 countries/groups of countries)009 to June 13, 2014. The map is available at https://www.google.com/maps/d/
tems focusing on viruses, the bacterium image represents surveillance systems
i, and the polymicrobial image represents surveillance systems monitoring various
Fig. 3. Summary of the main characteristics of the 262 surveillance systems registered from January 2009 to June 13, 2014. (a) Number of international and national
surveillance systems, and those that are neither. (b) Number of surveillance systems that are disease-speciﬁc (traditional surveillance) and those that are syndromic. (c)
Classiﬁcation of the surveillance systems according to what they monitor.
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species (14 for each).
5. The future of infectious disease surveillance
Developing surveillance systems to ﬁght infectious diseases is
a fast-growing and evolving ﬁeld (Fig. 4), engaging more and more
countries and resources. Disease-speciﬁc surveillance has
allowed the effective management of numerous epidemics and
infectious diseases. Smallpox was successfully eradicated in
1978 after the World Health Organization initiated a smallpox-
speciﬁc mass vaccination program that included laboratory
investigations.39 Similar results were seen in the case of
rinderpest, a disease directly infecting Artiodactyla species
(cattle, eland, buffalo, etc.) causing famines. This disease was
declared eradicated on May 25, 2011 after long-term efforts to0
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Fig. 4. Global change in the number of publications dealing wﬁght it through the development of the disease-speciﬁc Global
Rinderpest Eradication Programme.40 Nevertheless, thanks to the
global spread of Internet use and the unprecedented intercon-
nectivity of people that this allows, it can be speculated that, in the
future, improved syndromic surveillance systems will be coupled
with disease-speciﬁc surveillance systems, as has already been
done for inﬂuenza surveillance.17
Many surveillance systems survey few pathogens and not
necessarily throughout the year. The surveillance of infections
needs to be more global and instantaneous. This is a prerequisite
for the detection and notiﬁcation of abnormal events related to
infections, appropriate prioritization of public health threats, and
the implementation of optimal strategies and policies. Such
approaches appear increasingly feasible with the tremendous
expansion of computer resources, networks, and the real-time
acquisition and sharing of data worldwide.Year
ith ‘‘surveillance system’’ AND infect* from 1966 to 2013.
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